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ARTICLE

QUASI-PROPERTY: LIKE, BUT NOT QUITE PROPERTY

†

SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH

Quasi-property interests refer to situations in which the law seeks to simulate the idea of exclusion, normally associated with property rights, through a
relational liability regime, by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the
interaction in question, which is thought to merit a highly circumscribed form of
exclusion. In this Article, I unpack the analytical and normative bases of quasiproperty interests, examine the primary triggering events that cause courts to
invoke the category, and respond to potential objections to the recognition of
quasi-property as an independent category of interests in the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Tort, contract, and property have long been taken to be the foun1
dational categories of the common law. Very roughly speaking, tort
law deals with the breach of obligations imposed by law, contract law
with the creation and breach of voluntary obligations, and property
law with the rights and duties that relate to “things.” To this threefold
classification, courts and scholars have added two more hybrid cate2
gories: quasi-contract and quasi-tort. The law of quasi-contract deals
with situations where the law implies the existence of contract-like
obligations based on a party’s actions, and the law of quasi-tort (or
quasi-delict) refers to the law’s recognition of an obligation on the part
of one party to compensate another for reasons resembling actionable
3
wrongdoing.
So if the law of quasi-contracts deals with contract-like situations
that aren’t strictly contractual, and the law of quasi-torts with tort-like
scenarios that aren’t purely delictual, does a more prominent category
of situations exist where the law creates property-like entitlements,
but recognizes them to be something other than truly proprietary in

1

See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 20-32 (2d ed. 2005).
The origins of these categories are often traced back to the Roman jurist Justinian.
See Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 6 (Peter Birks ed., 1997).
3
For work on the category of quasi-contract, see generally WILLIAM A. KEENER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1893)
(five volumes); Arthur Linton Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533
(1912); William A. Keener, Quasi-Contract, Its Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REV. 57
(1893); Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2 CALIF. L. REV.
171 (1914); and Max Radin, The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract, 23 VA. L. REV. 241 (1937).
Scholarship on the idea of quasi-delict, which is much rarer, includes Nathan Isaacs,
Quasi-Delict in Anglo-American Law, 31 YALE L.J. 571 (1922), and Olivia Robinson, Justinian’s Institutional Classification and the Class of Quasi-Delict, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 245 (1998).
2
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character? Could it be that the idea of property is sufficiently loose and
open-ended so as to accommodate all property-like situations? In this
Article, I argue that there is indeed a coherent category of propertylike interests best defined by the term “quasi-property.” This category
consists of situations where the law attempts to simulate the functioning of
property’s exclusionary apparatus through a relational liability regime.
The idea of “quasi-property” is today commonly associated with the
4
Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated Press,
a decision credited with developing the common law doctrine of in5
formation misappropriation. Speaking for the majority, Justice Pitney
recognized the right of an information gatherer to prevent a competitor
from free riding on the original gatherer’s labor for a limited period
6
of time. What distinguished the interest recognized by the Court from
property, however, was that it would only ever exist between the two
7
parties in question and never in the abstract against the world at large.
Justice Pitney therefore used the term “quasi property” to describe the
entitlement.8 In the years since the opinion, hardly anyone has attached any significance to Justice Pitney’s use of the term to describe
9
this peculiar bilateral interest in exclusivity.
Justice Pitney’s use of the term “quasi property” was, however, very
deliberate. Beginning in the nineteenth century, common law courts
came to characterize some interests that sought to mimic the functioning of property solely as a mechanism of liability, as quasi-property in
nature. Rather prominent among these was a person’s right to control
the corpse of a dead relative—known as the right of “sepulcher”—
10
interferences with which were rendered actionable.
In both the
sepulchral rights and International News Service contexts, the law’s
choice of quasi-property instead of property was both conscious and
analytically significant.

4

248 U.S. 215 (1918).
See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002)
(attributing the term “quasi-property” to International News Service); 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 15.02 (4th
ed. 1986) (“The landmark case in this field, the INS case . . . is one of the most important cases, if not the most important, in the law of unfair competition.”).
6
See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 238.
7
Id. at 236.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Newman, 287 F.3d at 797 & n.13 (describing quasi-property as “a term with
little meaningful legal significance”).
10
See infra text accompanying notes 24-36.
5
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A property right has long been thought to center around the idea
11
of exclusion, and is often described as entailing the “right to exclude.”
The right to exclude is in turn believed to operate in rem (i.e., against
12
the world at large). The interest that the Court created in International
13
News Service, however, was consciously tailored to avoid being in rem.
Neither was it in personam (i.e., against a specified party, a characteristic commonly associated with contractual rights). Rather, the right
was to operate against a specified class of actors, and only ever upon the
occurrence of a specific triggering event.14 Through the use of a tailored
liability framework, the law sought to replicate the functioning of property rights as exclusionary entitlements. A resource would thus become
owned only within this highly contextual setting, while independent of
it, the resource remained unowned, thereby endowing it with a distinctively chameleonic character. The entitlement that the Court created
was therefore entirely relational and marked a major departure from
the in rem idea commonly associated with traditional property.
Quasi-property interests thus involve the use of a relational entitlement mechanism to simulate property’s exclusionary framework within
limited settings. As a category, its significance is more functional than
just taxonomical. A relational entitlement to exclude has a fundamentally different signaling effect from an equivalent entitlement created
by the traditional right to exclude commonly associated with property.
The distinction maps onto (but remains distinct from) the difference
between simple and relational legal directives used to distinguish between the functioning of the tort and criminal law systems. Whereas
criminal law communicates direct (and therefore simple) legal commands in the nature of “X act is prohibited” or “every X act will result in
11

See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (contending that
“use serves a justificatory role for the [property] right, while exclusion is . . . the formal
essence of the right”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 596-600
(2008) (noting the centrality of the right to exclude but explaining that the “right and
remedy” have been unlinked, with consequences for “intellectual property and property
more generally”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 730 (1998) (arguing that the right to exclude is not simply an essential aspect of
property; rather, “it is the sine qua non”).
12
Balganesh, supra note 11, at 602-03, 611-12.
13
See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236 (“[W]e may and do assume that neither party
has any remaining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter
after the moment of its first publication . . . .”).
14
See id. at 236, 241 (explaining that the “quasi property” right in the news “does
not result in . . . the right to monopolize either the gathering or the distribution of the
news”).
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Y punishment,” a liability framework (such as tort or unjust enrichment) merely specifies what individuals in a particular relationship to
15
each other are meant to do or not do. These communications are
thus of the form “A should/should not perform X act on B,” where A
and B are specified by class or context. Translated into the property
context, traditional property rights communicate a simple directive to
the world at large that relates to an identified resource (i.e., the res).
Property scholars have described this signaling as the directives of
“abstention,” “forbearance,” or “inviolability.” They signal to the
16
world: stay away—this resource is owned.
A quasi-property right, by contrast, doesn’t communicate the same
message. Instead, its directive operates in much the same way as those
of tort law—i.e., it merely signals to one party to stay away from an actual or fictional resource only when the two parties stand in a particular
relationship to each other, which is in turn activated by certain triggering facts. These triggering facts may be the parties’ statuses vis-à-vis
each other, the specific actions that one or both of them undertake,
the peculiarities of the context within which the parties interact over
the resource, or some combination of the three. Until one party
comes to be identified as standing in a particular relationship towards
the other (as recognized by the directive), no signal of exclusion is
communicated. This triggering is crucial and is indeed one of the
most unique features of a quasi-property interest. As a direct result of
the emphasis on the parties’ relationship, an exclusionary signal never
attaches to the resource itself in the abstract; instead, this signal is
mediated through the relationship.
This Article does three things. First, it unbundles the analytical
framework underlying the concept of quasi-property by focusing on how
quasi-property interests differ from traditional property rights. Second,
it shows why, in some situations, the law might choose to characterize
some interests as quasi-property rather than as property, and in the
process attempts to identify the law’s principal motivations for choosing one over the other. Third, it shows that the set of quasi-property

15

For a fuller treatment of this idea, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 88-93 (1998).
16
See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 11, at 71-72 (describing the exclusionary thesis);
Balganesh, supra note 11, at 619; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789-90 (2001). Indeed, the exclusionary principle can be traced as far back as Kant’s concept of property. See ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 90 (2009).
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interests in the law might in reality be much more expansive than is
currently believed.
The normative theme underlying much of this Article is that, while
the idea of property in law has at once expanded as a category and at
the same time come to be endowed with ideological significance, its
core architectural framework as a legal institution has fallen into ne17
glect in most contexts. The costs of this neglect are more than just
academic, since the concept of property exerts a huge influence on
people’s perceptions and incentives in different settings. Identifying a
set of entitlements that are “like, but not quite” property—quasiproperty—will go some distance in maintaining the conceptual and
analytical integrity of property as a normatively important institution
under the law.
The Article unfolds in three main parts. Part I sets out the idea of
quasi-property by focusing on the signaling effects of exclusionary interests created through relational liability regimes. In the process, it
endeavors to show that there is indeed a common underlying framework that connects these seemingly disparate interests characterized as
quasi-property, and that this framework derives from the fundamentally
different way in which these interests operationalize the idea of exclusion. Part II builds on the structural framework of the previous Part by
exploring possible reasons why the law might choose to regulate a particular resource or interaction through a quasi-property framework
rather than a traditional property- or tort-based one. Finally, Part III
considers and responds to a few possible objections to the recognition
of quasi-property as an analytically coherent category of interests in
the law.
I. THE IDEA OF QUASI-PROPERTY INTERESTS
The term “quasi-property” is today commonly associated with the
Supreme Court’s now-infamous opinion in International News Service v.
18
There, the Court refused to recognize a fullAssociated Press.
blown property right in news and instead chose to create an unfair
17

For an early identification of this phenomenon, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 69-73 ( J . Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
Nomos XXII, 1980); for the argument that ever since Coase, property has come to be
conceptualized less like a “distinctive in rem right” and more like a “list of use rights in
particular resources,” see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359-60, 366-75 (2001).
18
248 U.S. 215.
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competition–based action of “misappropriation,” which would func19
tion as a quasi-property interest in the news. International News Service
20
was, however, a case in equity. And, as I shall discuss below, equity’s
use of the term “quasi-property” to describe certain kinds of interests
predates the misappropriation doctrine by at least half a century.
Equity courts began using the term “quasi-property” to describe interests that resembled property rights in their functioning even when
they weren’t property rights, or, strictly speaking, ownership interests.
21
A “lien” on another’s property, an owner’s right to any improvements
22
made to his realty, or a mere beneficial interest in a property were
frequently termed by courts as interests that were quasi-property.23
The earliest systematic usage of the term arose a few years later in
relation to corpses. The rights and obligations of sepulcher refer to
24
the entitlements and liabilities associated with the burial of a corpse.
Very early in its development, English common law came to adopt the
position that there was no property right or ownership interest what25
soever in a corpse. This rule emanated from the rather strict division
between the courts of common law and the ecclesiastic courts: pursuant
to this division, the former were allowed to develop any rules necessary
to ensure the proper burial of corpses in accordance with any required

19

Id. at 236.
Id. at 240.
21
See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 324 (1857) (construing a statutory lien
as giving the furnishers of building materials “a quasi property in those materials, and
others with which it has been commingled in the building”); Gove v. Cather, 23 Ill. 634
(1860).
22
See, e.g., Horner v. Pleasants, 7 A. 691, 692 (Md. 1887); Balt. & Ohio R.R. v.
Chase, 43 Md. 23, 35-36 (1875); Casey’s Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430, 501 (Md. 1844).
23
See, e.g., Woodruff v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 605, 626 (1871) (“They had . . . an
interest in the cotton itself, the jus in re, which is quasi property; and the United States
held the cotton charged with that obligation of specific performance to which it was
subject when seized.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. The Elgee Cotton Cases, 89 U.S.
180 (1874).
24
For earlier works on the property law related to burial remains, see generally
Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 971-72 (1999), and
P.D.G. Skegg, Human Corpses, Medical Specimens, and the Law of Property, 4 ANGLO-AM. L.
REV. 412, 412 (1975). See also Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227,
235-44 (1872).
25
See Hernández, supra note 24, at 982 (“[E]arly English common law did not recognize property interest in a dead body . . . .”); Skegg, supra note 24, at 412 (“It is generally accepted that in English law the corpse of a human being is not the subject of
property, even though the person who is under the duty to dispose of it has a right to
possession for that purpose.”).
20
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26

religious practices. Edward Coke thus famously declared that under
the common law, corpses were “nullius in bonis” (i.e., no one’s prop27
erty).
As the common law crossed the Atlantic, however, this jurisdictional division presented a problem: the absence in America of a strict
separation between the common law and ecclesiastical law—
ecclesiastical courts did not exist in America—meant that the common
law could no longer simply avoid the subject along the lines suggested
28
by Coke. American courts were understandably reluctant to follow
29
the English rule. To such courts, corpses seemed deserving of some
protection against mutilation in order to protect the emotional interests of the family and the next of kin; ironically, though, that very reason also militated in favor of not treating corpses as ordinary ownable
30
resources. Courts in a number of states thus adopted a middle posi31
tion by applying the category of quasi-property to the interest. As
one early court, in identifying this conflict, observed,

26

See Hernández, supra note 24, at 993; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 407-08 (9th ed.

2009).
27

EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND;
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES
203 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817).
28
See Hernández, supra note 24, at 993.
29
See, e.g., Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 823-25 (Ind. 1890) (arguing that because of the “ecclesiastical element” inherent in England’s jurisprudence but “not
found in our[s],” England’s law should not “exert any controlling influence”); Pierce, 10
R.I. at 237 (noting that while “[t]he question is new in this state . . . there is no right of
property in a dead body”).
30
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he courts have talked of a somewhat dubious ‘property
right’ to the body, usually in the next of kin, which . . . cannot be conveyed, can be
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a
source of liability for funeral expenses.” (footnotes omitted)); Hernández, supra note
24, at 1026 (discussing the law’s need to balance the interests of the decedent and his
family).
31
For example, under Arkansas law, “the next of kin [has] a quasi-property right in
a dead body.” Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984). For examples of state
court cases identifying a quasi-property interest, see Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc.,
41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal.
1899); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 27 (Ga. 1905); Burney v.
Children’s Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897); Brown v. Maplewood Cemetery Ass’n, 89 N.W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 191 (Sup. Ct.
1891); Long v. Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 86 P. 289, 290-91 (Okla. 1905); Hackett
v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R.I. 1893); Pierce, 10. R.I. at 238; and Griffith v. Charlotte,
Columbia & August R.R., 23 S.C. 25, 41 (1885).
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[T]he burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of actual property.
There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right,
to protect from violation; and a duty on the part of others to abstain from
32
violation; it may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi property . . . .

Quasi-property thus emerged as the American common law term
for the possessory or custodial interest that members of a deceased’s
family had over the deceased’s mortal remains for purposes of disposal.
The use of the term, and the development of a liability regime, were
motivated by the impetus to protect the “personal feelings” or “senti33
ment and propriety” of the next of kin in having the corpse buried.
Prosser thus described this idea of a property-like right in the body to
34
be a mere “fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.” Nonetheless,
the fiction had real functional significance, since it enabled relatives to
recover damages upon commercial and noncommercial interferences,
and located the middle-level principle motivating this right in the idea
of possessing the corpse. In keeping with the limited purpose that the
interest served, the law came to forbid the conveyance of this quasiproperty interest and recognized it to be of no independent pecuniary
35
significance. Additionally, some jurisdictions also came to require
that the plaintiff establish some kind of “mental anguish” or a proxy
therefor before finding liability for the interference.36 Justice Pitney’s
use of quasi-property in International News Service was thus more than
just a play on words.
A second area in which courts have come to use the idea of quasiproperty in recent times is trademark law and the doctrine of trade37
mark dilution. Unlike traditional trademark infringement, which is
32

Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237-38; accord Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 191 (“It is the almost universal
practice among civilized people to scrupulously conform to the wishes and requests of
friends and relatives as to the disposition to be made of their bodies.”).
33
Hackett, 26 A. at 43.
34
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63.
35
See, e.g., Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 191; Long, 86 P. at 292 (“[E]quity will always aid one in
the enjoyment of a legal right, even though no property interests are involved.”).
36
See, e.g., Galvin v. McGilley Mem’l Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (“The gist of the cause of action, as presently evolved, is the emotional distress
and anguish to the nearest kin from mistreatment of the body.”).
37
See, e.g., Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Dilution law, unlike traditional trademark infringement law . . . is not based on a likelihood
of confusion standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a [trademark] holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.” (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003))); Ringling
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predicated on a showing of consumer confusion, trademark dilution is
an action that seeks to protect the “capacity of a famous [trade]mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services”38 as a quasi-property interest
that is actionable independent of consumer confusion.39 Treated as a
quasi-property interest, reputation is protected through a heavily circumscribed exclusionary framework that is tailored to the centrality of
perception, which forms the source of its protection-worthy attribute.
The quasi-property framework allows trademark to retain its roots in
the ideas of deceit and unfair competition without abandoning the
40
idea of exclusionary protection altogether.
While the rights regimes that the common law came to create in the
news, corpses, and the reputation of a trademark may at first seem completely unrelated, they in fact exhibit important structural similarities.
First, in all three contexts the law consciously avoids the recognition or
creation of an ordinary property right in the subject matter involved.
While the law’s reasons for this avoidance are different, avoidance of a
property interest was nonetheless crucial to the development of all three
regimes. Second, despite its avoidance of creating a traditional property right in rem, the law nonetheless evinces the belief that there is
some value in the idea of imposing a limited duty of forbearance.
Third, this duty is heavily circumscribed by considerations that emanate directly from the parties’ actions, interactions, and statuses, and
only indirectly relate to the subject-matter in question. Finally, the law
deems it appropriate (or necessary) to impose liability on actors that

Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp.
605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“A federal dilution claim . . . shifts the focus away from
consumer protection and towards the protection of an owner’s quasi-property right in a
famous mark, itself.”).
38
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining “dilution”), amended by Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-33 (striking definition of “dilution” from 15 U.S.C. § 1127 and fleshing out dilution law in § 1125).
39
See Kellogg, 337 F.3d at 628 (laying out the five-part test for trademark dilution
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:70 (4th ed. 2009) (“Dilution . . . might
occur where the effect of the defendant’s unauthorized use is to dilute by tarnishing or
degrading positive associations of the mark and thus, to harm the reputation of the
mark.”).
40
See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow
of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1835 (2000) (“[T]rademark law is
instead viewed as . . . developing from the notion of unfair competition . . . [which] in
turn evolved from the commercial tort of fraud and deceit. Hence, . . . courts . . . use
elements of both the tort of deceit and trespass, . . . which results in quasi-property
protections.” (footnotes omitted)).
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breach this duty in different ways. While this fourth point is unexceptional, the second and third points are crucial to the idea of quasiproperty. The first, regarding avoidance, is the subject of the next
Part.
41
Central to the idea of property is exclusion. Classifying an interest
in an object as a “property right” thus entails endowing it with (i) an
exclusionary significance (ii) that is largely objective, in the sense of
being insensitive to time, place, and context. An interest is endowed
with exclusionary significance when a norm of inviolability (i.e., the
duty of forbearance) is associated with the object that the interest
42
This inviolability may originate either in a social norm
relates to.
43
(more likely for traditional tangible resources such as land and chattel)
44
or entirely in a legal directive (more likely for intangibles like patents).
Yet regardless of its source, the norm operates by identifying the
boundaries of the object and imposing a duty of forbearance (or exclusion) on everyone—the indeterminate set of individuals—other than
45
the owner. The insensitivity to context is an attribute of property’s
status as an in rem right, which operates against the world at large
(i.e., against strangers to the right-holder, and independent of any
46
causal relationship between the parties).
A quasi-property interest works by relaxing both of these features
of traditional property rights. It deemphasizes the connection between
the interest and the resource; as a result, the resource comes to be
devoid of objective exclusionary significance. Yet because exclusion
remains a crucial feature, quasi-property must still allude to property as
an idea. Instead, the law generates the exclusionary framework through
the creation of a liability regime that focuses on a different set of interests that are implicated in the parties’ interactions. These interests
41

See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to
exclude others.”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing
“the right to exclude others” as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property”); Merrill, supra note 11, at 752 (“[T]he
right to exclude is the sine qua non of property.”).
42
For a more in-depth analysis of the norm of inviolability and the right to exclude,
see Balganesh, supra note 11, at 625-29.
43
See id. at 624 (“The precise strength of the norm tends to vary across resource
and context. . . . Much of the variation depends on social custom.”).
44
See id. at 628-29.
45
Id. at 625-29.
46
For the leading account unbundling the idea of the right in rem, see Albert
Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322 (1920).
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in turn relate to, but do not emanate exclusively from, the resource.
They derive instead from the nature, context, and consequences of the
parties’ interactions—much like the laws of tort and unjust enrichment—and less from the connection between the resource and the
right-holder. As a result, the exclusionary significance of the right is
targeted only at a determinate set of actors.
This heightened determinacy certainly does not imply that the
quasi-property interest is purely ad hoc; in the abstract, the interest
preexists the identification of a defendant. But until the defendant
enters the picture and is identified (by relationship, action, or harm),
the plaintiff’s interest is practically inconsequential; unlike traditional
property rights that are meaningful even prior to their infraction, it is
latent at best. Quasi-property interests thus hang “in the air,” to borrow then–Chief Judge Cardozo’s analogous description of negligence
47
law, unless or until a defendant is identified.
Returning to our examples of quasi-property reveals how this common framework functions. In International News Service, the Court
created a liability framework that would allow one newsgatherer to
exclude another from the time-sensitive news that the former collected,
48
but only when they were both direct competitors in the same market. The
parties’ relative statuses—here, as direct competitors—triggered the
quasi-property exclusionary framework. Exclusion thus relates to the
time-sensitive news (its subject matter), but hardly emanates from it,
since without the parties’ statuses vis-à-vis each other, news has little
objective exclusionary significance. The exclusion is thus highly sensitive to the peculiarities of the context. So too it is with the rights of
sepulcher discussed earlier. A person is allowed to exclude another
from the corpse of a relative, but only when that person is likely to suffer mental anguish as a result of the latter’s actions. Here, the exclusionary framework is triggered by both the plaintiff’s status in relation
to the deceased and the nature of the defendant’s actions.
What we thus see happening in these quasi-property settings is that
the exclusionary signal, commonly associated with a property interest,
isn’t fully mediated through the res. Property scholars have long identified the creation of a jural relationship mediated through the

47

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting FREDERICK
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING
FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
48
See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235-36 (1918).
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resource as a characteristic feature of the law of property rights. This
mediation is thus thought to enable the true in rem nature of the
right, since it allows for both owner and interferer to remain indifferent
50
to each other’s identity and characteristics. In the quasi-property context, however, the law communicates its exclusionary signal independent of the resource—even though it relates the signal to the
resource. Indeed, the exclusionary signal emanates from the relationship between the parties in question: their statuses vis-à-vis each other,
their interaction, or the particular context within which they interact.
Only when this relational dimension is implicated does the resource
come to be endowed with the limited exclusionary significance that
resembles the functioning of property. The description above thus
implicates two interrelated analytical elements for quasi-property interests: a trigger for the exclusionary signal, and its communication as a
signal to actors.
A. Triggering Exclusion
One characteristic feature of quasi-property interests is that they
endow a resource with exclusionary significance only within certain
narrow domains that are in turn triggered by certain circumstances.
Until and unless these circumstances arise, the resource in question
remains nullius in bonis (i.e., unowned). The additional significance of
these triggers is that they can in some sense be turned “off.” Thus,
when the factual circumstances that affirmatively endow the resource
with exclusionary significance disappear, the exclusionary significance
itself also ceases to exist. This off switch is particularly important because, as we will see below, it influences the nature and functioning of
the legal directive involved.
Nearly eight decades ago, noted theorist and legal realist Leon
Green published a series of articles under the title “Relational
51
Interests,” wherein he voiced exasperation that courts tended to
49

See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 11, at 29 (“The criterion is whether the duty is in any
way specific to particular individuals in terms of its content.”); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 17, at 364 (“[I]n rem property rights . . . attach to persons insofar as they have a
certain relationship to some thing.”).
50
See PENNER, supra note 11, at 30 (“Norms in rem establish the general, impersonal
practices upon which modern societies largely depend. They allow strangers to interact
with each other in a rule-governed way, though their dealings are not personal in any
significant respect.”).
51
For the series of articles, see Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460
(1934) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1)]; Leon Green, Relational Interests,

Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

1902

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/7/2012 7:55 AM

[Vol. 160: 1889

characterize certain interests as forms of property with the sole objec52
tive of invoking and applying equitable considerations. He instead
proposed treating these interests as a distinct category of interests that
were not in any sense connected to a “tangible thing,” but instead focused on protecting a relationship that the plaintiff had to another
53
individual or society. Green’s basic intuition was in some sense correct: courts were directly reacting to the relationship between the parties rather than just to their interaction through a tangible object.
However, Green’s analysis breaks down when he insists (i) that the relationship always involved a third party (beyond the litigants) and (ii)
54
that the relationship needed to preexist the dispute in question. By
relaxing these two assumptions, we can make sense of why courts were
treating some interests as property-like: the courts were looking to the
consequences and effects of the exclusionary framework on the parties’
relationship (or interaction).
Generally speaking, then, quasi-property interests originate in the
circumstances of parties’ relationships broadly understood. What triggers courts’ identification of these relationships (for their invocation
of quasi-property) is (i) the status of the parties vis-à-vis each other, (ii)
the unique environment or context within which they interact, (iii) the
nature—wrongful or otherwise—of one party’s actions, or (iv) a combination of these factors. Each of these factors requires brief elucidation.
1. Status
In situations where the law seeks to regulate parties’ interactions
over a resource as a result of their unique status vis-à-vis each other,
quasi-property proves an ideal vehicle. The paradigmatic instance is of
course the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine, which endows timesensitive news with exclusionary significance only when the parties are
direct competitors in the same market, a requirement that involves an
55
analysis of their relationship. Their status as competitors in the same
30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935) [hereinafter Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2)]; Leon Green,
Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936).
52
See, e.g., Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 (“This inadequacy
of classification has proved extremely costly to legal science . . . .”).
53
Id. at 460, 462.
54
See id. at 462 (“While in hurts to personality, or property only two parties, plaintiff and defendant, are involved, in hurts to relationship interests, three parties must
always be involved.”).
55
See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (explaining
that the test for misappropriation examines “the rights of complainant and defendant,
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market is thought to necessitate ensuring that one doesn’t free ride on
the information gathered by the other through the creation of an
exclusionary framework limited to the duration for which the parties
56
retain this status as competitors.
Another domain where the status of a party imbues a resource with
57
limited exclusionary significance is that of insider trading. There,
courts endow market-sensitive factual information with limited exclusionary significance when obtained and used by someone who has the
58
status of a fiduciary to the source. What seems to matter in these settings where the law emphasizes the parties’ status is the fact that the
parties’ objective/relative positions mandate that they pay greater at59
tention to the manner in which they obtain and use certain resources.
The normative focus of the regime is thus on the harm that is likely to
occur directly from their status (e.g., unfair competition or market
fraud) rather than any harm to the resource or through its use in the
60
abstract.

competitors in business, as between themselves,” rather than “the rights of the complainant as against the public,” since the purchaser of a newspaper has different rights
in relation to the seller and the news than does the competitor who would “transmit
that news for commercial use . . . in order to divert a material portion of the profit
from those who have earned it”); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The
Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 438-40 (2011) (elaborating
on the relational requirement in the misappropriation doctrine).
56
See Balganesh, supra note 55, at 448-49 (“In the Court’s understanding, free riding was problematic because it allowed a competitor to lower its costs and compete on
unfair terms with a collector of the news.”).
57
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (adopting the misappropriation theory for insider trading). Misappropriation theory and insider trading
are closely related. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading,
Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1266-68 (2001);
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Privatizing “Outsider Trading,” 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 696 (2001).
58
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“[T]he fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when
the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to the
principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.”); see also Saikrishna
Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1504-06
(1999) (“[T]he misappropriating trader deceives those who entrusted her with confidential information.” (footnote omitted)).
59
Cf. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983) (discussing possible reasons for allocating property
rights in corporate information to “insiders” rather than shareholders).
60
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
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2. Context
In some instances, the environment within which the parties interact over the resource is one that is especially sensitive and deserving of
protection. By treating the resource as a form of quasi-property and
imbuing it with limited exclusionary significance, the law seeks to
protect the parties’ interests in circumstances under which they are
most likely to be affected. The quasi-property nature of sepulchral
rights belongs to this category. As courts have long noted, the common
law came to endow a corpse with limited exclusionary rights vested only
in parties who were likely to suffer emotional anguish upon an interference, and deemed these rights to be infringed only by activities that
were in turn most likely to cause such anguish directly.61 Thus, courts
62
have limited such quasi-property claims to “close family members,” and
have cabined the nature of a required infraction to an “intrusion, man63
handling, or manipulation” of the corpse. They have also disallowed
64
65
monetary claims for conversion or for mere invasions of privacy.
Much as with status, the primary harm that the law of sepulchral rights
seeks to protect originates in the effects of the defendant’s actions on
the plaintiff’s circumstantially vulnerable emotional wellbeing, rather
than any harm to the res as such.
3. Conduct
A third set of situations in which the law invokes the quasi-property
idea involves a defendant’s morally ambiguous behavior, which,
though directed at the plaintiff, affects some res. Here, courts often
hesitate to create a full-blown property interest in the res for either

61

See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010).
63
Riley v. St. Louis County, 153 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1998); accord Culpepper v.
Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo. 1994) (“Clearly, there can be no property
right in a dead body in a commercial sense, since a dead body cannot be bartered or
sold. Some courts have recognized a quasi-property right in dead bodies for the limited
purpose of seeing that the body is decently interred or disposed of.”).
64
See, e.g., Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 882 & n.6; Boorman, 236 P.3d at 9; see also Bauer v.
N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that
because Mrs. Bauer “has no pecuniary interest in her husband’s corpse, . . . accordingly,
Mr. Bauer’s corneal tissue is not subject to valuation” with respect to her conversion
claim).
65
See, e.g., Riley, 153 F.3d at 631 (denying a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment invasion of privacy claim because the protection is for highly personal matters only).
62
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66

formal or substantive reasons. They choose instead to impose liability
on the defendant by tailoring the law’s exclusionary framework to the
conduct that they seek to censure. The law of trade secrets—as well as
the multiple causes of action under the heading of unfair competi67
tion—fits this description in large measure.
We might also include within this category situations in which the
party whose actions are morally ambiguous isn’t the potential plaintiff.
Various kinds of equitable claims (such as liens) that are recognized by
courts but are nonetheless treated as inferior to another party’s
68
stronger claim are good examples here. For instance, some courts
treat the doctrine of accession as creating a quasi-property right in the
69
mistaken improver’s contribution to the resource. Such a claim is
treated as inferior to the true owner’s superior claim—it doesn’t come
into existence unless the improver’s conduct, which, while technically
70
a trespass, is nonetheless found to have been in good faith.

66

The distinction between formal and substantive reasons here often implicates
courts’ equitable, as opposed to ordinary common law, jurisdiction.
67
See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917) (noting how the focus was on behavior and not the asset itself); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Role of Unfair Competition in the Common Law
(describing the nature of the focus in greater detail), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012); Ramon A. Klitzke,
Trade Secrets: Important Quasi -Property Rights, 41 BUS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986) (“It is clear that
[trade secret protection’s] home port is fairness and honesty between business competitors.”).
68
See, e.g., Hunter v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318, 323-24 (1857) (finding a supplier of
building materials to have a lien over his contribution to the building); V.S. Cook
Lumber Co. v. Harris, 71 P.2d 446, 450-51 (Okla. 1937) (treating the interest of a shareholder who has borrowed on his stock as quasi-property, subject to the superior claim
of the corporation); Att’y Gen. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 578-80 (1874) (upholding, against a Contracts Clause challenge, the right of the state to set the maximum tolls that the defendant railroad companies could charge passengers or freight
shippers, since “[a]s far as the franchise [to toll] is considered property, it was subject
to this limitation,” reserved by the state, that the franchise could be altered); MARIE C.
MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 188-89 (1985) (describing a museum’s interest as a gratuitous bailee or trustee in terms akin to quasiproperty).
69
See Harmon D. Maxson, Comment, Property—Damages for Timber Trespass, 1 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 434, 436 n.7 (1958) (noting that, with regard to the property principles
presented in Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882), “it is recognized even
in courts of law that an equitable and quasi-property right is acquired by one who in
good faith adds value to the property by his labor, although the property . . . may be
that of another”).
70
Id. at 436 n.6.
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It should be fairly apparent from the discussion above that the categories of facts that trigger the law’s choice of a quasi-property framework are hardly watertight. A party’s status might thus in some ininstances inform the court’s analysis of its conduct (as in International
News Service) or motivate the adoption of a quasi-property framework.
What is crucial in all these settings is that the law’s choice not to endow
the resource with objective exclusionary significance is both conscious and
analytically meaningful.
B. Signaling Relational Exclusion
Having seen the conditions under which the law might choose to
endow an actual or notional res with limited exclusionary significance,
it is worth exploring how exactly the law chooses to communicate this
decision. Liability regimes impose duties and obligations on actors that
are best described as “relational” in nature, since they identify both an
action that triggers liability and an actor to whom the obligation is
71
owed. Property law, too, operates as a system of liability, notwithstanding its in rem nature characterized paradigmatically by the law of
72
trespass. And while it may be true that, under property law, actors
owe a duty of forbearance to the individuals who own the res in question, this obligation is communicated via the res, which mediates it.
This structure occasionally produces the mistaken idea that the obligation is owed to the resource and not to the individual. In quasiproperty, on the other hand, the law endows the res with only limited
exclusionary significance, yet the directive is almost never communicated through the res itself.
71

See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 945-46 (2010) (describing torts as “relational, injury-inclusive wrongs”); Zipursky,
supra note 15, at 88-93 (1998) (describing tort law as “rights, wrongs, and recourse”).
72
I am conscious here not to equate the regime of liability surrounding property
rights as simple “liability rules” under the Calabresi-Melamed framework. As scholars
have long shown, that framework focuses largely on the “protection” of an entitlement,
which has in recent times come to be equated with remedies rather than rights. The
framework also says little about the analytical bases of the underlying right that the
regime protects or the “first-order question” about who should obtain the entitlement
and why. For more information on the property-rights framework, see Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1347-52 (1986); and Henry E.
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 973 (2004).
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Quasi-property revolves around a directive best described as “relational forbearance.” Such a regime imposes (and communicates) a
limited duty of forbearance on individuals when they acquire a particular status in relation to the interest-holder, or when the context of
their interaction or conduct necessitates limited exclusion. This duty
of forbearance is only ever imposed relationally, by reference to the
interest-holder rather than the object of the interest. Individuals are
directed by the law to avoid interfering with the object of the interest
under a particular set of circumstances, defined with a good measure of
specificity. By emphasizing the circumstances of interference rather
than the interference itself, the law moves away from the object and
towards the relationship between the interest-holder and the interferer.
In the process, the normative basis of exclusion moves away from the
boundaries of the object and towards the circumstances necessitating
exclusion. It is this feature that differentiates the law of trespass from
the category of quasi-property. While trespass law emphasizes the
boundaries of the object as the source of the duty of forbearance, quasiproperty, on the other hand, communicates forbearance relationally
and with reference to the unique circumstances calling for exclusion.
The rationale for employing relational forbearance instead of a
general duty of forbearance in turn derives from the law’s need to
make clear the precise reasons for the exclusionary framework. Quasiproperty serves to break what is often referred to as the “irreducibility
of ownership”—the belief that property and ownership as conceptual
devices preclude any further investigation into the reasons for which
73
they exist. By refraining from endowing the res in question with the
objective status of an “owned” resource, quasi-property draws attention
to the reasons why the law might nonetheless choose to endow the
interest in question with limited exclusionary significance. Often, it
turns out that these reasons have little to do with the abstract connection between the interest-holder and the object—believed to be central
to property—but rather derive from a specific context or setting within
which that connection becomes necessary to further other values or
goals. The commodification of the object is clearly secondary to other
interests, and the quasi-property framework allows for these other
interests to be considered more directly.
73

This idea owes its origins to Jim Harris. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE
64-66 (1996) (“Ownership acts as an irreducible organizing idea in the daily, noncontested functioning of a property institution. No inferential move from the content
of all these rules can give us a list of the privileges and powers which ownership entails.”).
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In important work, Henry Smith has shown how property law attempts to delineate rights through either an “exclusion” strategy,
which focuses on a “thing” and simple on/off signals for the directive
(e.g., boundary-crossing as trespass), and a “governance” strategy, which
is more fine-grained and involves a more circumstantial determination
74
of when a right is infringed. The choice of strategy is thought to em75
anate from the law’s attempt to optimize information costs. More
recently, Smith has extended this analysis to the property/tort interface
to argue that “[w]here property starts with a thing as the beginning for
delineating rights, tort law takes action as its starting point.”76 Although
Smith doesn’t directly address the source of the directive in either
formulation, his theory suggests that property law’s in rem directives
emanate from the thing itself, while in tort law they originate in the
duties of care around which tort law’s focus on an individual’s actions
77
revolve. Smith thus implies that there is a continuum wherein the
law’s focus moves from thing to action—depending on its normative
focus—embodied in the move from property to tort. From a communicative standpoint, this move manifests itself in shifting the focus
from communicating the directive as a general exclusionary message
via the res to a more nuanced action-based command via relational
duties.
Quasi-property interests originate precisely at this transition point.
What Smith characterizes as actions can be disaggregated into conduct,
context, and status, all of which generate obligations against which the
defendant’s “actions” are judged in the assessment of liability. As the
law moves away from communicating its obligations through the thing
and towards doing so through relational duties, it comes to a point
where the costs of imprecision favor greater granularity in the regime.
Even so, the res continues to remain a viable mechanism around which,
rather than through which, to communicate that signal. The thing, in

74

See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467-78 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance] (casting exclusion and governance as rules of access and of use, applied
according to their respective costs and benefits); see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual
Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1749
(2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property as Property] (applying this distinction to
explain the difference between patent and copyright law).
75
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 74, at S467-71.
76
Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2,
2011, at 1, 14.
77
Id. at 14.
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other words, forms the focal point for the relational duties from which
the law generates its obligations, even though it doesn’t form the conduit for the obligations as such.
It is indeed this narrow set of interests that seem to fit the description of quasi-property. Smith is therefore correct to fault theories of
tort law that he describes as “commodification”-based, which attempt
to treat any interest protected by liability as a proprietary one (e.g.,
reputation or a business opportunity), and to suggest that in reality
78
something else is going on in these contexts. In the next Part, I propose some possible answers to explain what these regimes are trying to
achieve normatively. At the very least, however, a major structural difference that Smith’s observation captures is the fact that these quasiproperty regimes communicate a fundamentally different kind of exclusionary signal: one that relates to the thing, but which is nonetheless
rooted in the background conditions relating to the parties’ interactions surrounding the thing.
II. REASONS FOR QUASI-PROPERTY INTERESTS
Having examined in the previous Part how quasi-property interests
work and the way in which they communicate their exclusionary signal
to actors, this Part examines why the law might select the framework of
quasi-property for certain kinds of interests. Why, in other words,
might the law want an interest to function like property, without calling it a full-blown property interest? In answering this question, I distinguish between two kinds of conflicting influences. The first are best
described as affirmative influences, or reasons that might push the law
toward treating certain interests as regular property rights to begin
with. To some extent, these influences track ordinary reasons for the
emergence of property rights in the ordinary setting. The second set
of influences push in the exact opposite direction and inject a meaningful degree of caution into the framing of the interest; we might call
these factors negative influences. Some combination of affirmative and
negative determinants therefore results in the law’s choosing to cabin
the exclusionary regime relationally, and to this end adopting the idea
of quasi-property. The affirmative influences explain the property element of quasi-property, while the negative ones account for the quasi
element.
78

See id. at 6-9, 14-16 (describing situations in which both property and tort law
may apply, and others in which one or the other is more appropriate).
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At the outset, two important cautionary notes about these influences are in order. First, the determinants identified here are largely
79
(if not exclusively) instrumental in their orientation. It necessarily
follows that the law’s reasons for choosing quasi-property as a category
in some instances must be instrumental, as well. While not precluded,
an immanent explanation for the evolution of these interests remains
less plausible given the relatively recent nature of these interests as a
80
formal category (in comparison to property). Second, in seeking to
explain why quasi-property interests emerge in different contexts and
in offering reasons for their emergence, I do not suggest that common
law courts have engaged in some kind of concerted attempt to move
the law in a particular direction. As with much of the common law,
these developments have occurred across time and context, oftentimes
81
without any reference to each other. Despite this caveat, this Part
seeks to establish that these interests nevertheless did not develop in an
entirely ad hoc manner.
A. Affirmative Influences
The first group of influences is in some sense propertarian, since
they motivate the law towards creating a property interest around the
res in question. Such influences track the law’s instrumental justifications for the creation of property rights in resources.
1. Preserving Economic Value
Starting with the work of Harold Demsetz, economists have long
posited that property rights emerge in scenarios where the benefits of
82
internalization outweigh the costs of exclusion. A milder version of
79

I use the word “instrumental” here in the broadest sense of the term, and not
necessarily to implicate utilitarian or social welfare–related objectives.
80
For an intrinsic account of the common law’s core conceptual categories, see
BIRKS, supra note 1, at 20-32. In contrast to Birks’s account, my account here consciously recognizes that courts do develop common law concepts and categories in the
pursuit of policy goals.
81
For a similar account of the common law in relation to intellectual property, see
generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010).
82
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to
achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”); see also Terry L. Anderson & P.J.
Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163,
165 (1975) (“Establishing and protecting property rights is very much a productive
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this thesis is seen in some quasi-property interests, where the belief is
that the nature of the parties’ interaction around a thing is likely to diminish its objective market value, thereby necessitating limited exclusion. Quasi-property interests emanating from the idea of unfair
competition are paradigmatic of this concern, which in some sense
83
tracks the idea of free riding. Unlike traditional intellectual property,
however, the economic value that the law seeks to preserve does not
emanate from exclusivity as such, since that would render the motivation circular. Instead, the economic value is thought to derive from a
party’s actions, for which the thing forms an easy and indirect referent.
2. Creating an Identifiable Focal Point for Coordination
Legal rules operate by providing individual actors with a common
focal point around which to coordinate their behavior. They perform
an important guidance function by helping to set expectations as to
84
what other actors will do in a particular setting. Property law has
long been known to perform this function in different social settings
85
by mediating its directives of exclusion through the res.

activity toward which resources can be devoted. But, like any other activity, the amount
of this investment will depend upon the marginal benefits and costs to investors of
allocating resources to these endeavors.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz
Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S332 (2002) (“Desmetz
hypothesized that property rights emerge when some change in the relative value of
resources occurs that makes it cost-effective to internalize costs that previously were
experienced as externalities . . . .”).
83
See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (2005) (arguing that, in the intellectual property context, courts and commentators treat such property as real property—which “leads them to an almost obsessive preoccupation with identifying and rooting out that great evil of the modern
economic world—free riding”).
84
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1651 (2000); see also Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of
the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 865, 866 (2008) (“[W]hen the parties involved have some common incentive
to ‘coordinate’ their behavior, the law’s articulation of a behavior will tend to create selffulfilling expectations that it will occur.”). Indeed, recent experimental evidence seems
to suggest that the focal point theory, at least in a modified form, holds true for property
law. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
449, 452 (2010) (“How a property entitlement is framed . . . will affect the attitudes and
behaviors of societal actors subject to legal rules and influence policymakers as they
choose among possible legal rules.”).
85
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 788 (describing how the two-way nature of
property’s in rem structure performs this coordination function through the res);
PENNER, supra note 11, at 49.
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Quasi-property interests incorporate this element of property into
their functioning. While they signal liability for certain actions, they
frame the liability regime around an actual or notional res in understanding the action in question, thereby enabling individuals to coordinate their behavior not solely by reference to the action, but also by
reference to the res. The right of sepulcher is a good example. While
the liability regime certainly focuses on the defendant’s actions and
the likely emotional harm they will cause to the plaintiff, the actions
are judged by reference to their effects on the corpse (the res), not
86
their effects on the plaintiff directly. In turn, this channeling through
the res allows actors (medical examiners, mortuaries, etc.) to coordinate their behavior around the res.
3. Expanding Remedial Options
Perhaps the most obvious reason why courts might choose to characterize some interests as being endowed with attributes of property
derives from the special treatment that proprietary rights historically
received in equity.87 Historically, equitable (or extraordinary) remedies were restricted to rights that were proprietary rather than personal
in nature, and over time, courts strove to structure the regimes they
were creating as proprietary in nature in order to avail themselves of
88
such remedies.
Scholars have long noted the absurdities that this distinction created
89
before it eventually broke down. Nonetheless, the impulse motivating
86

In other words, on the assumption that it will have caused mental anguish, the
interference with the corpse is considered sufficient to trigger liability. This cause of
action does not require an independent showing of such anguish or harm, as is required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l
Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010).
87
See, e.g., Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ct. Ch.) 674 (noting that relief in equity for libel could only be sustained on protection of rights of property). For
early accounts documenting and criticizing this rule, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 642-46, 668-77 (1916),
and Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115, 12226 (1923).
88
See generally Green, Relational Interests (pt. 2), supra note 51, at 39-40 (describing
how English courts invoked the idea of property in order to sustain equitable jurisdiction).
89
Id.; see also Green, Relational Interests (pt. 1), supra note 51, at 461 (“Courts, having
assumed that equity would only protect a property interest, have constantly expanded
the property concept to include every sort of valuable interest which they deemed worthy
of protection.”); William Bliss Giles, Note, A Re-Interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25 MICH.
L. REV. 889, 889 (1927) (explaining that the Gee rule “has been so severely criticized
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this distinction remains, and in no small measure. The movement towards treating some forms of privacy claims as centered around “prop90
erty” —and indeed the recent debates about the availability of
91
injunctive relief for intellectual property —are evidence of this impulse.
Treating an entitlement as covered by a quasi-property framework
might thus allow for equitable relief to become readily available for
infraction of the entitlement. In fact, some courts view the Court’s use
of the concept of “quasi-property” in International News Service as motivated by precisely this objective.92
B. Negative Influences
In contrast to affirmative influences, which explain why courts remain influenced by the idea and metaphor of property in their construction of the quasi-property interest, another set of influences—
which I label negative influences—push courts in the exact opposite
direction. These influences explain why the law doesn’t go all the way
toward classifying the interests in question as property rights. In equilibrium with one another, the affirmative and negative influences produce the midway position of quasi-property interests.

and so strained in its application that one is inclined to doubt that it has appreciable
vigor at the present time”).
90
See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1289 (2000) (noting a “recent upsurge” in “[t]reating privacy as a property right”);
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000)
(explaining that “some American commentators have proposed that the law should
grant individuals a property right in their personal data”); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling
Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 737, 744-45 (2004) (discussing the issue of “whether genetic information should
be treated as property”).
91
See Balganesh, supra note 11, at 649-50 (explaining that “the Federal Circuit had
developed a general rule in the context of patent injunctions, under which the courts
granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction once validity and infringement were factually
proven”).
92
For example, in Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v Taylor, the High
Court of Australia agreed with Justice Brandeis’s dissent in International News Service and
observed that
courts of equity have not in British jurisdictions thrown the protection of an injunction around all the intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange,
which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or resources
whether in the organization of a business or undertaking or the use of ingenuity,
knowledge, skill or labour.
(1937) 58 CLR 479, 509 (Austl.).
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1. Avoiding Expressive Commodification
Commodification refers to the process by which some thing comes
to be understood in the popular mind as a “commodity” to which a
93
price can be attached, and for which a market exists. Integral to this
process is the identification of the thing that then operates as the
commodity. Commodification as a process is thought to entail both an
extrinsic and an intrinsic dimension—with the former referring to the
way in which outsiders perceive participants’ interaction around an
object, and the latter to the way in which insiders themselves model
94
their interaction around the object. In numerous contexts, however,
the law and/or actors within a specific social setting find the process of
95
“commodifying” certain objects or values to be deeply problematic.
Such objections may emanate from both deontological precepts (e.g.,
not wanting to treat babies as things in adoption law), or from purely
instrumental ones (e.g., not wanting to encourage the trade of babies
because of the regulatory problems that it is likely to engender).
What is important here is that commodification as a process can
come about both through the law’s actual regulation of behavior and
96
in its expressive dimension. In the former, the law’s active treatment
of certain items as tradable commodities becomes relevant, whereas in
the latter the law’s signaling that some items are to be treated analogously to commodities is what matters. Although the two often go together, they do not have to. It is the latter set of scenarios that courts
see as problematic in some quasi-property contexts. A court’s identification of an object as a res certainly doesn’t result in it being commodified as an operational matter, in the sense of creating a market for the
object as such. It nonetheless signals that the law conceives of the object
as a commodity, albeit for a limited, regulatory purpose: what one
might call “expressive commodification.” And much like in other types
of commodification, this limited, expressive commodification is also
seen as problematic—for the same kinds of reasons as in the original
97
context of commodification. In turn, this impulse is what pushes the
93

See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-2 (1996).
Id. at 2-3.
95
Id. at 131.
96
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2036-38 (1996) (discussing how and why social norms ban “commodification”); id. at
2045-48 (using emissions trading in environmental law as an example of how commodification can come about through the law’s expressive function).
97
Id. at 2036-38.
94
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common law to adopt the category of quasi-property, a position midway between declaring an object to have full exclusionary significance
and giving it no such significance at all.
We see this influence at play in relation to both sepulchral rights
and the misappropriation doctrine. With regard to sepulchral rights,
common law courts have explicitly observed that calling a corpse
someone’s property or an owned object is problematic for moral (and
98
sentimental) reasons. Indeed, courts have thought such commodification problematic, even for the limited purpose of providing redress
for interference with the corpse. This impulse to avoid commodifying
corpses as an expressive matter thus moved the law in the direction of
quasi-property.
The same logic was at work in International News Service, where the
Court held that the news, the “history of the day,” the object that the
plaintiff sought to be infused with exclusionary significance as a form
of property, was instead “publici juris”—“common property” that could
99
not be owned privately. Again, the Court might have called the news
“property” for the limited purpose at hand, yet the impulse against
expressive commodification once again seems to have pushed in the
other direction.
2. Preserving the Ethereality of Subject Matter
Creating a property right around a res necessarily requires identifying the boundaries of the res that is being endowed with exclusionary significance. And when the exclusionary signal or directive is
mediated entirely through the res, determining its boundaries thus
assumes additional functional significance. Despite property law’s move
away from the “lay” or unscientific conception of property as a thing,
identifying the res—either as a factual or notional matter—still con100
In relation to
tinues to influence the way in which property works.
tangible resources, defining the res poses few problems (if any). With
98

See, e.g., Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999) (“The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it
be . . . . [O]ur laws . . . will not impose a pecuniary value on the flesh itself. To do so
would make the strangest thing on earth that much stranger.”); see also PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 30, § 12, at 63 (“It seems reasonably obvious
that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that
it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are being protected . . . .”).
99
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-35 (1918).
100
For a description of the unscientific or lay conception of property, see BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1977).
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intangibles, however, defining the boundaries of the res is hardly a
101
costless exercise. Delineating the metes and bounds of an intangible
in order to give it exclusionary salience involves significant administrative and judicial costs. A good example here is intellectual property,
where the legal system has historically attempted to optimize the costs
of delineating the res in multiple ways—ranging from a voluntary selfidentification (i.e., claiming) system, requiring various kinds of formalities, or by mandating a deposit of the item being endowed with exclusionary significance.102
Costs aside, one can also see independent affirmative reasons for
the legal system to avoid defining the precise boundaries of the res.
Most, if not all, quasi-property regimes originated in the common law
and thus emerged in the context of liability regimes that developed
103
inductively by generalizing from the context of a particular dispute.
All the same, in order to survive and develop incrementally, the principle of liability that developed needed to do more than deal with the
specifics of the dispute before the court. Because the common law
speaks in generalities, courts developing quasi-property regimes began
to abstract from the particular in order to preserve their legitimacy
104
Thus, even when they came to identify a
and future applicability.
res, courts instinctively gravitated towards generalizing its essence
rather than specifying or delineating it with precision. That task was
relegated to the stage of rule application.
Trade secrets are a good example of this phenomenon; so, too, are
notions of the “distinctiveness” of a trademark and attributes of an individual’s “persona”—all of which are technically the res of quasi-property
interests. What we see in such scenarios is that the law consciously
avoids delineating the intangible subject matter of protection with any
measure of precision, and instead describes the subject matter by class,
101

See Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 74, at 1787, 1793 (envisioning
a model to explain the cost of clarifying boundaries of the protected “res” in intellectual
property law).
102
See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
719, 730-52 (2009) (describing the claiming systems in both patent and copyright law).
103
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law (1870), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 212, 212 (Sheldon M. Novick
ed., 1995) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”).
104
See id. at 213 (“New cases will arise which will elude the most carefully constructed
formula. The common law, proceeding . . . by a series of successive approximations—
by a continual reconciliation of cases—is prepared for this, and simply modifies the
form of its rule.”).

Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Quasi-Property

6/7/2012 7:55 AM

1917

characteristic, or category in the belief that the delineation is best
achieved from within the context of adjudicating an infraction and not
prior to it. The law, in other words, chooses to preserve the fluidity of
the res, and to adjudicate the possibility of any boundary crossing ex
post.
3. Tailoring the Res to the Actio
A third influence derives from the law’s need to tailor the interest
involved with a high degree of precision because of the costs associated
with overinclusiveness. In some ways, this point flows from, and is intricately connected with, the previous one. On the one hand, the law
seeks to preserve the unbounded nature of the res to allow for flexibility
and applicability to future contexts. Generalizing or abstracting to the
res from the particular context of the dispute is thus central to preserving this flexibility. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that
the law’s ultimate focus is on the defendant’s behavior, which the law
seeks to regulate through a mechanism of liability. Thus, while flexibility cuts in favor of generalization, which in turn motivates a general
reluctance to define the precise boundaries of the res, the focus on
the defendant’s behavior seeks to align the boundaries of the res with
105
While these two influences aren’t
the actions that trigger liability.
diametrically opposed, they nonetheless complicate the process of defining the res around an identifiable object.
The law of trade secrets is a good example of this phenomenon.
The need to develop a generalizable regime pushed the common law
in the direction of treating any valuable information that was subject
106
to some measure of secrecy as a possible trade secret. However, such
an abstract definition results in a weak exclusionary signal. Moreover,
trade secret law has long been thought to exist in order to ensure
“[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” among market
107
actors. Thus emerged the idea that the taking (or misappropriation)
of a trade secret could come about only when the secret was acquired
105

This theory of trade secret law corresponds roughly to what Smith has described
as the “governance strategy” for organizing property rights. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance, supra note 74, at S455-56.
106
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998) (“[A]lmost anything can qualify as a trade
secret, provided it has the potential to generate commercial value . . . [including] customer lists, pricing information, business methods and plans, and marketing research
data.” (footnotes omitted)).
107
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).

Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

1918

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/7/2012 7:55 AM

[Vol. 160: 1889

108

through “improper means.” Notice that the nature of the res of such
a trade secret is transformed. The res is now any valuable information
subject to secrecy, if and when it is acquired through improper means.
109
On its face, this construction may seem absurd. Why should the
nature of the interference have any bearing on the structure of the
res? The answer is that in the absence of any other indicator, the
understanding of the interference forms the only exclusionary signal
that relates to the res. The improper means idea—the notion that the
regime seeks to regulate a certain type of action—is functionally as
much a part of what constitutes a trade secret as is the underlying information itself. The action, simply put, influences the functional
conception of the res.
What accounts for this influence, then, is the law’s functional focus
on the defendant’s activity. In order to focus in on the precise activities,
the directive of liability needs to be highly granular, so a lumpy exclusionary signal becomes inadequate. A more tailored governance-style
signal becomes necessary. All the same, it is important to note that the
law doesn’t formally abandon the idea of boundary-crossing that is
central to property. If it did, there would simply be no need to identify
the “trade secret”; the law could simply focus on the means of appropriation and use. Instead, the law adopts a midway position: quasiproperty.
III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
Now that we have seen what the idea of quasi-property entails, the
way in which it functions, and the influences that move the common
law in the direction of creating and recognizing such interests, this
Part considers and responds to three possible objections to the recognition of quasi-property as an independent category of interests in
the common law. These objections derive from (A) sporadicity—that
the law’s sporadic usage of the term ought to caution against inferring
a coherent analytical framework for these interests; (B) analytical incoherence—that there might be interests in the common law that are
property-like but analytically very different from quasi-property as
108

Bone, supra note 106, at 250-51; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005) (“‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage . . . .”).
109
Indeed, even Bone treats the “misappropriation” requirement as going to liability
rather than the definition of trade secrets themselves. Bone, supra note 106, at 250.
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described here; and (C) realism—that quasi-property ought to be seen
as a mere placeholder for courts to invoke certain remedies, consequences, and results in individual cases. I consider and respond to
each of these objections in turn.
A. Sporadicity of Usage
The claim advanced in this Article is that quasi-property refers to a
wide set of interests in the law that involve a common analytical
framework—one where the law seeks to simulate the functioning of
property’s exclusionary framework relationally. As I have shown, the
set of interests following this pattern is, in reality, much more expansive than merely the specific instances where the law has expressly
described the interest as quasi-property. The laws of trade secrets,
publicity rights, idea protection regimes, and insider trading can all be
seen as following the same analytical pattern as those instances where
courts have explicitly described the entitlement being enforced as
quasi-property. All the same, one might argue that courts’ unwillingness to extend the nomenclature to such settings is deliberate. The
sporadic nature of quasi-property recognition, this argument goes,
represents a reticence rooted in the absence of a common analytical
basis for these cases, which is precisely what my argument hinges on.
By failing to call trade secrets (and other similar interests) “quasiproperty,” the argument goes, courts are in fact signaling that there is
no such category with which to work.
While descriptively accurate, this objection misses the functional
significance of the argument being offered here. In effect, it operates
along the lines of what legal theorists call a “transparency” objection,
or one rooted in the self-understanding of the law.110 According to the
transparency criterion, the express reasoning offered by courts (and
the law more generally) must necessarily correspond to its actual and

110

See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 24-32 (2004) (explaining “transparency” as a criterion for assessing interpretive theories of contract); see also JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO
LEGAL THEORY 27 (2001) (noting that objections based on self-understanding of tort
law “cannot serve as a functional explanation of the core of tort law”). But see Jody S.
Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense
of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349-56 (2007) (embracing the efficient evolution model of the common law as “postulating a causal mechanism” undermining Smith and Coleman’s views of transparency).
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111

unstated reasoning.
The law’s self-understanding must track any
understanding of it that outsiders seek to develop.
Yet the transparency criterion is largely irrelevant in establishing
the validity of quasi-property as an analytically independent category in
the law. It is irrelevant because the traditional context within which
112
transparency becomes necessary is the domain of “reasoning.”
The
practice of legal reasoning is fundamentally different from the process
of identifying a legal category, unless such identification is invariably
accompanied by a strong reliance on analogy. In the development of
common law categories, analogies have always been drawn in factual
113
In other words, for example, trespass
rather than analytical terms.
law almost never looks to the law of negligence for analogies, even
though both are understood as “torts” with a common analytical
framework revolving around the law’s imposition of an obligation on
actors and its allowance for a claim of unliquidated damages upon
breach. If any reasoning by mere analogy to category is abjured, the
need for transparency largely dissipates. Thus, when reasoning is not
at issue, the law’s self-understanding need not map onto our external
understanding of how it performs its analysis. It is precisely this nuance
that the sporadicity objection misses.
It thus matters very little that courts and judges themselves don’t
expressly describe all scenarios in which they are seeking to simulate
property’s exclusionary framework relationally as quasi-property. Even
if courts did describe these interests as such, little would automatically
result. Indeed, it is precisely in this manner that the common law’s set
114
of categories has continued to evolve over the years. The numerous
causes of action that are today described as relating to the law of restitution for unjust enrichment represent an example of such a devel-

111

See SMITH, supra note 110, at 25 (“[T]o account for law’s claim to be transparent a
legal theory of the common law must, inter alia, take account . . . of the reasons that
judges give for their decisions.”).
112
See, e.g., id. at 28 (“[A] good legal theory should explain the law in a way that
shows how judges could sincerely, even if perhaps erroneously, believe that the reasons
they give for deciding as they do are the real reasons.”).
113
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 85-102 (2009) (distinguishing
analogy made on the basis of factual similarity from precedent); Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993) (“[A]nalogical
reasoning focuses on particulars, and it develops from concrete controversies.”).
114
For an introduction to the mapping of legal concepts, see STEPHEN WADDAMS,
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
REASONING 1-22 (2003).
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115

opment.
Few today would claim that the mere fact that judges do
not make reference to the common analytical thread unifying restitution ought to negate its legitimacy as an independent category.
B. Incoherence from Metaphorical Use
The incoherence objection is the exact opposite of the sporadicity
objection. Here the argument is that there exist numerous areas where
the law seeks to simulate property’s functioning without describing the
right as a property right. The use of property as a “metaphor” in such
disparate ways, therefore, is not an analytically coherent way of think116
ing of these interests.
Prominent examples include the “pre117
118
possessory interest,” equitable ownership, restitutionary rights in
119
equity, and entitlement claims during bankruptcy and divorce pro120
ceedings. In each of these situations, the law seeks to treat the interest
or asset as a form of property for a very limited purpose. Why, then,
shouldn’t these interests also merit characterization as quasi-property?
The response to this objection is fairly straightforward. The idea
of quasi-property advanced here entails more than the law’s mere simulation or metaphorical reliance on the idea of property without also
classifying an interest directly as a form of property. Of fundamental
significance to the analysis are the questions of what is being simulated
and how this simulation is being achieved. First, the interests identified as quasi-property seek to simulate property’s core commitment to
115

See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 25-36 (2004) (identifying these concerns as valid but recognizing the area to present a “loose framework”
category).
116
See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet:
The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
265, 327-31 (2006) (adopting an incoherence objection to the application of property
metaphors to the Internet).
117
See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *5-8 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (holding that a baseball spectator who had caught a Barry Bonds
baseball had a legally cognizable prepossessory interest).
118
See, e.g., S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 567, 570 (1946) (describing the
federal government’s security interest in a piece of private property as a form of “equitable ownership”).
119
See, e.g., Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Bldg. Co., 333 S.W.2d 619,
628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (“[W]hen a person, acting in good faith without negligence,
in the mistaken belief that he is the owner of the land, erects improvements on the
land of another, he then has an equitable interest . . . in the land . . . to the extent his
improvements enhance[] the value of the land . . . .”).
120
See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715-17 (N.Y. 1985) (declaring that
a professional license earned during a marriage should be considered marital property).

Balganesh Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

1922

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/7/2012 7:55 AM

[Vol. 160: 1889

121

exclusion.
One may certainly advance the familiar argument that
property is not only about exclusion, but that it also ought to focus on
other dimensions, such as inclusions, affirmative obligations, and the
122
like. Regardless of whether such a contention is true, the fact remains
that quasi-property as an idea takes as given a connection between
property and exclusion, and in turn tries to replicate this connection
in a situational manner. Second, the simulation isn’t a mere nominal
123
It uses the law’s
or expressive one; rather, it is deeply functional.
liability framework and its generation of guidance rules to achieve the
same effect as property’s exclusionary signal (which is mediated
through the object of the property right). Quasi-property is thus
much more than just the attempt to replicate some effects of property
without using the term property to describe the interest.
In short, for an interest to be classified as quasi-property, the simulation has to be of a very specific kind. This requirement excludes a
variety of other instances in which courts are attempting to replicate
124
just some aspect of property.
Far from enabling the unregulated
attachment of the quasi-property label—a haphazard approach that
would undoubtedly dilute quasi-property’s coherence—in the conception I advance, the category of quasi-property interests embodies an
equilibrium maintained by its unique modality of property simulation.
C. Beyond Formalism
The last objection to quasi-property as a category of interests origi125
In this
nates in the legal realist critique of common law formalism.
objection, quasi-property is seen as a mere placeholder used by courts
to invoke a set of remedies and consequences ordinarily associated
121

For more on this connection, see supra note 11 and sources cited therein.
See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37-55 (2011);
Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1853-60 (2012) (distinguishing exclusion property from governance property where there exists a multiplicity of owners and interests within the “black box”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 285-89 (2008) (arguing that the
exclusion approach to ownership does not tell us enough about the owner’s position).
123
Quasi-property is vastly different from the idea of “incomplete commodification” made famous by Margaret Radin. See RADIN, supra note 93, at 102-03 (defining
“incomplete commodification” as “the social state of affairs envisioned by” social policy
and other such norms).
124
See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
125
For an interesting recent account on the realist–formalist divide, see BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING
(2010).
122
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with property, without having to classify an entitlement as a property
right for all purposes. Quasi-property in this conception is seen to
have such little analytical meaning of its own that it fails to merit identification as an independent category. Instead, the view is that quasiproperty is a strategic device invoked for a variety of consequentialist
reasons, not all of which are the same. Quasi-property is thus simply a
product of what it lets courts do with an entitlement, rather than a category of entitlements with independent analytical meaning.
While this objection has some merit, it misapprehends the role
that I claim for quasi-property as an independent category in the law.
To begin with, it frames the distinction in excessively binary terms, and
as such ignores the possibility that a category of entitlements may derive its meaning entirely from its functioning—i.e., the consequences
that it produces when applied. The problem that lies at the root of
the objection arises only when this meaning is thought to embody an
immanent rationality within the category, independent of its functioning—a “mechanical jurisprudence.”126
Indeed, an objection along these lines has been made against the
category of property itself within the law. Alluding to its meaninglessness, the noted Scandinavian Legal Realist Alf Ross argued that property could well be replaced by the term “tû-tû” and produce the same
results, if society came to understand the term to produce the same
127
consequences as property. In a similar vein, Tom Grey advanced the
argument that the idea of property disintegrated in the law and con128
sequently could no longer remain a “central category” of thought.
Despite these claims, property continues to remain a normatively significant category in the law, one whose meaning today is thought to
originate in largely functional terms. Thus, it doesn’t dilute the coherence of a legal category if the category derives its meaning from the
consequences that it produces, so long as the set of such consequences
is finite and can be identified in advance.
The understanding of quasi-property advanced in this Article
doesn’t rely simply on formalism. Rather, it pays clear attention to the
126

Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-07 (1908)
(describing the formalist approach as entailing a form of mechanical jurisprudence);
cf. TAMANAHA, supra note 125, at 28 (arguing that mechanical jurisprudence was a
trope, not a reality ever believed by any legal scholars or judges).
127
Alf Ross, Comment, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 815, 818-19 (1957).
128
See Grey, supra note 17, at 82 (“The development of a largely capitalist market
economy toward industrialism . . . must lead to the decline of property as a central category of legal and political thought.”).
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reasons why courts invoke the category and the consequences that flow
from this choice. At the same time, my theory posits that there is a
common analytical—even if not normative—framework underlying
quasi-property. I certainly do not advance a mechanistic idea of the
category, and do not presume that courts must rely on it in some deductive sense. Rather, the argument for quasi-property actively embraces
realism, without allowing quasi-property to abjure all reliance on cate129
gories and concepts in the law altogether. Indeed, many of the reasons suggested for the evolution and use of the category derive quite
legitimately from “policy” considerations that are exogenous to the
category itself, an idea that is fundamentally at odds with a formalist
approach to constructing categories and concepts in the law.
CONCLUSION
Quasi-property forms a plausible category of interests in the common law where the law chooses to simulate property’s exclusionary
framework through a mechanism of relational liability. While there
isn’t a consistent pattern of usage for the concept in any one area, one
can still trace a common structural framework in the areas where
courts do frequently employ the idea. What we begin to see in these
areas is that the idea of quasi-property is employed in situations where
the law wants to signal limited exclusion, yet at the same time is reluctant to connect the directive to the res itself. Instead, the law chooses
the framework of a liability regime to communicate this directive in a
relational, bilateral manner.
Ever since the Realist turn in legal thinking, legal concepts and
categories have come to matter increasingly little to courts, scholars,
and even students of law. The idea of “property” is no exception. Indeed, the concept today is understood less as a category and more as a
set of consequences flowing from certain situations. “Property is what
property does” has become the dominant way of thinking about the
idea. In the process, the concept has come to be stretched and applied to a host of situations, either directly, by analogy, or as metaphor,
with the result that Grey’s famous declaration of property’s conceptual
“collapse” is arguably truer today than it was when originally made.130
129

In fact, the term “realism” itself means several different things. For a useful
attempt to reconcile realism and common law conceptualism, see Hanoch Dagan, The
Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2003), and Hanoch Dagan, The Realist
Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 647 (2007).
130
Grey, supra note 17, at 74.
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Taking quasi-property seriously as a category and concept in the
common law is on its own unlikely to go far in stemming this trend.
All the same, it highlights an important and unappreciated dimension
to the idea of property in the common law: an element of introspection,
so to speak, in the law’s own framing of an interest as a metaphor or
simulation of the idea of property. In characterizing certain interests
as property-like, but not property, the law can be understood as signaling that property as a concept does indeed have some core static content that it is seeking to mimic through a liability regime. One hopes
that the recognition of this core content might provide courts and
scholars with reason to pause before altogether writing off property as
a normatively and functionally insignificant category in the law.

